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Abstract
This paper analyzes return intentions of temporary migrants. An intertem­
poral model will be developed where the point of return to the home country 
is endogenous. Hypotheses implied by the theory are then empirically tested, 
using micro data on migrant workers to Germany. The empirical analysis fol­
lows two steps: first, the intention of the migrant whether or not to return is 
analyzed. Secondly, the length of expected duration of those who want to return 
is investigated. The empirical results are consistent with the implications of the 
theory.
*1 am grateful to Tony Atkinson, David Card. Steven Martin, John Micklewright, Louis Phlips, 






















































































































































































1 In tro d u ctio n
Return migration1 was, and is a widely observed phenomenon. This is true not only 
in Europe and between European and extra-European countries, but also in Asia as 
well as between Asian countries and countries of the Middle East. Migration decisions 
of return migrants are induced mainly by economic motives. Return migrants do not 
initially have a strong desire to live in the target country for other than economic 
reasons.
The target countries of return migration are generally characterized by an excess 
demand for labor in at least some segments of the labor market. This labor can not be 
supplied by the local workforce either in the quantity requested, or at adequate prices, 
or both. The emigration countries usually exhibit an excess supply of labor and/or 
wage rates that are far below those offered in the target countries.* 2
Economic theory has little to say about return migrants. There are a number of 
open questions. First of all, why do return migrants initially intend to return? And- 
why. after living for some time in the host country, some do return, and others would 
like to stay permanently? Are there measurable characteristics that help to distinguish 
between those who want to return, and those who want to stay? And why do some 
migrants stay longer than others?
Answers to these questions may help policy makers to control return migration 
and to target eventual incentive programs more efficiently. Migration policy could be 
designed to influence the migrants decisions so as to correspond deliberately to the 
targets of policy makers. The understanding of the migrant’s decision process is an 
important presupposition for the construction of effective migration policies.
This paper will try to give answers to some of the questions raised above. Section 
2 develops a theoretical model of return migration. The model implies that the time 
a migrant worker intends to further remain in the host country (and, in the limit, the 
intention whether or not to return at all) depends essentially on 4 factors: the earnings 
situation in the host country relative to that in the home country, the perception of
'T he term return migration will here be used to characterize a situation where migrant workers 
return, or, at least, initially intend to return to their country of origin after a significant period abroad.
2In the 50’s, 60’s and 70’s, the labor requirements of Western Europe’s industrial economies and 
poverty as well as unemployment in Southern European countries and in Turkey induced an immi­
gration boom from the periphery countries into the core of Europe. At present, a similar situation 
can be found between Asian countries, like Thailand, and the Gulf states. It is likely that return 





























































































environmental factors (social relations, climate etc.) abroad relative to that at home, 
the remaining lifetime horizon, and the stock of savings accumulated so far. In section 
3, the qualitative implications of the theory are empirically tested, using micro data 
on temporary migrants to Germany. The data set contains information about the 
intention of the migrant whether to stay permanently in Germany or not. For those 
who do not wish to stay permanently it includes information about the number of years 
migrants want to stay before returning home. The empirical analysis follows two steps: 
first, logit models are estimated, differentiating between the subsample of those who 
want to return and those who want to stay permanently. Secondly, and restricting the 
analysis to those migrants who want to return, a duration analysis is performed on the 
migrant’s intended further duration in the host country.
The study provides some insight into the dependence of migrants return proba­
bilities and intended spells of further duration on measurable characteristics.
2 T h eory
The classical argument to explain migration is the following: neglecting any fixed 
costs of migration, a worker has an incentive to migrate when, given his stock of 
human capital, his potential earnings are higher in the host- than in the home country. 
Therefore, if earnings differentials were the only determinant for migration decisions, 
migrants would only return when the economic situation changes so that earnings at 
home will significantly increase relative to those of the host country.3 However, since 
return migration is a phenomenon that can be observed even without such changes 
of economic situations in the countries concerned, migrants are obviously not only 
maximizers of lifetime income. Without exogenous restrictions on their choice set, 
such behavior indicates that migrants are not simply maximizers of lifetime income. 
They rather maximize a utility function that contains some arguments that may explain 
the temporary nature of migration.
It is a common observation that utility created by the consumption of goods de­
pends not only on the quantities consumed, but also on the environment where such 
consumption takes place. More specifically, it seems to be the case that the environ­
ment where consumption comes about is complementary to the utility created by the
3When real wages are higher in the host country, but prices are lower in the home country, a 
temporary migration may be optimal even when the migrant is a maximizer of lifetime income. Such 





























































































consumption good itself. The notion environment as it will be used here could com­
prise social relations, subjectively perceived life quality parameters, like climate, social 
regulations etc., family and friends. When analyzing agents’ consumption behavior in 
a relatively stable environment, any interactions between environment and the utility 
gained by the consumption of some good may be neglected. However, when analyzing 
agents who may, involuntarily or by choice, meet their decisions over their life cycle in 
two completely different environments, such interactions should be considered. This 
would be especially the case when investigating migrants who may return to their home 
countries.4 The purpose of this section is to model their migration and re-migration 
intentions.
To formalize the notion environment, define an index N  that summarizes all 
parameters that determine this environment. Let N  be a further argument in the 
individual’s utility function. N  is assumed to be complementary to consumption.5 
Turning to the situation of the migrant worker, let N  = G when the migrant resides 
in the home country and N  = F  when he stays abroad. The migrant's migration- or 
re-migration decision is now based on the wage differential between home- and host 
country as well as on these environment indices.
Whenever G > F  (the environment index is higher in the home- than in the 
host country), and wages are higher abroad, the migrant worker may decide to migrate 
only temporarily. Both, F and G may, and probably will, change over the migrant’s 
migration history. The longer the migrant stays abroad, the more he integrates into 
the new society, finds friends etc., and the less he feels attached to his home country 
environment,. This process of social integration or disintegration is likely to affect 
strongly the size of the environment variables F and G, and is usually not perfectly 
foreseeable for the migrant worker. The migrant may therefore determine an optimal 
time to stay abroad at the beginning of his migration history, basing his decision on how 
he perceives F and G at that moment, or he may as well determine an expected path of 
F and G, E{F(t)}J0 and £{0(1)}^, where T is the horizon to be considered and 1° the
4An important point seems to be worth emphasizing in this context: the difference between per­
manent migrants (migrants who migrate with the firm intention to stay permanently) and return 
migrants who initially intend to return but eventually stay forever. The economic behavior of both 
groups in the host country is likely to be very different. A return migrant who in the end stays per­
manently may have had over a long period of his stay in the host country the intention to return. As 
long as he wants to return, his economic decisions are sensitive to this intention, and it is irrelevant 
whether he finally stays permanently.
Complementarity is here defined in the sense of Edgeworth and Pareto: Y is complementary to X 
in the consumers budget if  an increase in the supply of X  ( Y constant)  raises the marginal utility of 




























































































point of decision making. Should now F and G change over the migration history in a 
way not previously foreseen by the migrant worker, he will reoptimize and redefine the 
time he further intends to stay abroad. Eventually, a previously intended temporary 
migration may become permanent - and this is an often observed phenomenon.
To clarify these ideas, a formal dynamic model in continuous time will be set up, 
describing the migrant’s optimization problem. After some simplifications, an explicit 
solution for the time the migrant considers as optimal to still remain in the host country 
will be presented. The theoretical model implies qualitative predictions of the impact of 
explanatory variables on the migrant’s intentions. It therefore provides the theoretical 
framework for the empirical analysis in section 3.
2.1 A  Form al M odel
Consider a migrant worker who decides at some point of his migration history how 
long he further wants to remain in the host country.6 Assume that he has the following 
simple utility structure:
f  u '  = t f V ( 0 ,F ( 0 )  : t < i  m
\ U E = UE(<?(t),G(t)) : t > i
with U\ > 0, t 'j  > 0, C'j, < 0, U22 < 0, U[2 > 0, i = I. E, where /  signifies the 
immigration (host) country and E  the emigration (source) country. The subscripts 1,2 
indicate derivatives with respect to the first or second argument, respectively. The flow 
of consumption in country i is denoted by c‘, and F and G are the respective indices 
for environment as described above, t is the optimal time of return. Note that t is 
endogenous. F  and G may change over time, but they are assumed to be independent 
of the migrant’s decisions.7
To get some analytical results, assume that U is a Cobb-Douglas utility function. 
The migrant’s lifetime utility function is then of the following form:
V =  / T[c, (t)“ F(f)“- , e-',i]A(0 + [cB(0“GW“" 1e ',’‘][l-A (0 ]d t (2)
Jto
6The migrant will solve the same problem when he has to decide whether or not to migrate.
7This is, of course, not necessarily the case. The migrant may consciously influence (and, therefore, 
control) the adoption to his environment, e.g. by investment into country specific human capital (see 




























































































where p is the rate of time preference and [7' — f°] is the horizon considered. A(f) is a 
switching variable that takes the value 1 or 0, with \(t)  =  1 for t < t and Aft) =  0 for 
t > t .  The intertemporal budget constraint is given by:
k ( t )  = A(t) [ / ( / )  -  c'(t)] + [1 -  A(t)] [yE(t) -  cE(t)} +  r  K(t)  (3)
where y'(t) are earnings per unit of time, evaluated at t, in country i =  /, E , and r  is 
the rate of interest. K(t) is the migrant’s wealth at t. Accordingly, K(t) are savings 
at t. The migrant’s optimization problem consists of the maximization of (2) subject 
to (3), where he chooses the path of c‘, i = E ,I ,  and the path of A(<). He thereby 
determines the point of return. When the optimal path for A is A(t) = 1 V(, t £ [f°, T], 
then the migrant will not return to his home country. Likewise, should it be optimal to 
set A(t) =  OVt, t £ [<°, T], then the migrant will return immediately.8 In what follows, 
the interior solution will be considered: it will be assumed that there exists a switching 
point of A over the interval ft0. T].
The problem is a dynamic optimization problem. Setting up the Hamiltonian H , 
application of the maximum principle gives the necessary conditions for c'lij. cE(t), I \(t) , \( t)  
being an optimal solution to the problem (together with (3)):
dH 
U.C1 : 7r(t) =  [acf ( i ) ° '1 ]e-pt (4-a)
dH
dcE : *(<) = [ac£(t)u-
i rt*\ t 'W  jc (4-b)
—  : Tr(t)\yI( t ) - y E[t) + cE( t ) - c I(t)] + [U(cI( t ) ,F ( t ) ) -U (cE(t).C(t))}e pi = 0
(4-c)
5̂IT1II1̂31 (4-d)
[K(T) — K] t (T) = 0 (4-e)
The Hamiltonian is given by:
8When considering this decision problem before the migrant has migrated, the latter case would 





























































































H = [A(0 PVW, F(0) + (1 -  A(i)] UE(cE(t), G(t))] e~pt + *(t) K(t) (4-f)
The costate of the system, indicating the inner value of a change in the stock of savings, 
is denoted by ?r(t). (4-e) is the transversality condition, where A denotes the desired 
stock of savings at the end of the planing horizon. Note that, since A(t) € {0,1}, the 
paths of cf,cE and A have a discontinuity at t =  t. Note further that (4-c) is only 
defined for t =  t. It follows from (4-d):
ir(t) = jt(T) er<‘- T> =  t  er(' - T) (5)
The optimal paths of consumption abroad and at home are then given by:
c(ty  =  F(t) i ^ er(.-T)+„<a
for t < t (6-a)
c(t)E =  G(t) for t > t (6-b)
Substitution of (6-a) and (6-b) into (4-c), and arranging terms, results in the following 
expression:
— f  er(<_r)+'>l
0-1 1 — Q
a Q [G(0 -  F(01 = 1 /(0  -  yE(t)\ (7)
Solving equation (3) gives the following:
K(t°)e'‘ + f ‘ e 'C-H!,'(*)- c '( s ) ld s  
K(i) er‘ +  f j  er(,_a) [yE(s) -  cE(s)] ds
t < t 
t > t
It follows for A'.(T):
( 8)
e r (T -i )+ J  er(T - > [ y £ ( s ) - c E(s)]ds
0 )
When [£?(<) > F(t)] and y \ t )  > yE(t) V<, then it follows from (9) that A’(t) > 0 for 
t < t and K(t)  < 0 for t > t. Accordingly, the migrant will accumulate savings while
K(T) eriK(t°) +
J o




























































































being abroad, and he will use up his stock of savings when back in his home country. 
This behavior of migrants is often referred to as target saving and it is a common 
feature of return migration.
Equations (6-a), (6-b), (7), and (9) determine the optimal paths’ of consumption 
at home and abroad, cE and c1, the stock of savings, K(t), and the time of return, t.
For illustration, the problem will now be simplified to get an analytical solution 
for t. Assume, for simplicity, that the stock of savings the migrant worker intends to 
hold in t = T, K(T),  is equal to zero: K(T)  =  0. Denote the stock of savings at t° as 
K°. Furthermore, set y1 (t) = w1 and yE(t) =  wE. This assumption implies that the 
migrant considers his wage level, either at home or abroad, as remaining at the same 
level over the whole time horizon considered. In other words, the migrant assumes his 
stock of human capital as constant over his future life. Finally, let the migrant base 
his decision on the current size of F  and G: G(t) = G and F(t) = F. Normalizing 
t° = 0, and setting p =  r  =  0 and a = 0.5, equation (9) simplifies to:
I\° + t[w' -  wE] + t[cE - c ‘] + r  \wE -  cr ] = 0 (10)
Note that, under the above assumptions, it follows from (6-a) and (6-b) that the flow 
of consumption is constant in each country: cE(t) = cE and c; (f) =  c1. (7) may then 
be rewritten as:
1 G - F
4 wl — wE ( 11)
Denoting the wage differential [u/ — wE] as A and the differential of the environment 
indices, [G — F], as T, and solving (6-a), (6-b), (10) and (11) for t. one gets:
i = T  [GA — wE F] -  A'0 T 
2 AT ( 12)
The optimal time the migrant intends to further stay abroad is a function of the wage 
differential A, the differential of the environment indices, T, the lifetime horizon T  and 
the stock of savings at t = 0, K°. Totally differentiating (12) and rearranging terms 
results in the following expression:
dt = T w E + K°
2A2
dA T G




A G -  r*
2 AT dT (13)
Accordingly, for T > 0 and A > 0, the time the migrant intends to further remain in 




























































































horizon T. It depends negatively on the degree of attachment to the home country, 
relative to that of the host country, as represented by T, as well as on the accumulated 
stock of savings when the decision is taken, K°.
3 E m p irica l A n a lysis
The data^used for the empirical analysis are drawn from the first wave of the German
r+-
Socio-Economic panel (1984). The panel comprises 4500 households of German nation­
ality atfd 1500 households of foreign nationality. The vast majority of the latter group 
consists of so-called guest-workers, migrants with Spanish, Yugoslavian, Turkish, Greek 
and Italian nationality, who migrated to German}' mainly before 19739. This migration 
was meant to be temporary by the German government and, at least initially, by the 
migrants themselves.
The panel contains information about all persons living in a respective household, 
ai® well as on the household as such. The data used for this analysis stem from the 
sftgsample of migrant workers, and concern only personal characteristics. The analysis 
isTSfased on a question in the personal questionnaire which related to the foreigner’s 
indention about how long to remain in Germany. Migrants were asked whether they 
would like to stay in Germany forever, or whether they want to return to their home 
countries in either the next 12 months or in some years. Those who replied that they 
intend to return in some years time were further requested to specify the number of 
years they want to remain in Germany.
According to this information, the stock of migrants in the sample can be separat­
ed into two groups: those who want to stay permanently in Germany (452), and those 
who want to return to their home countries after a specific number of years (1282).
Consider these two groups on the basis of the above theoretical analysis. For 
those migrants who would like to stay forever the solution of the optimization problem 
in section 2 would be a corner solution (A(t) = 1 Vt,< 6 {t°,T}).  On the other 
hand, for those who specify the number of years they would like to stay in Germany 
before returning, the solution of the above optimization problem would be an interior 
one. According to equation (13), differences in the number of years a migrant wants to 
remain before returning home are explained by differences in the perceived environment 
at home and abroad, F, individual wage differentials between home- and host country, 
A, the remaining lifetime horizon, T, and the amount of savings allocated so far, K°.




























































































Accordingly, for the latter subgroup the theory provides hypotheses for the qualitative 
impact of a set of explanatory variables on the migrant’s intention. The theory also 
implies that those factors which have a positive effect on the time the migrant decides 
to stay further in Germany should help to differentiate among the two subgroups of 
those who want to stay forever, and those who want to return sometime in the future.
3.1 E stim ation  M eth ods
For the empirical analysis, each of the environmental factors will be characterized by 
a vector of variables available in the data set. The analysis will be conducted in two 
steps:
First, logit models will be estimated to determine the impact of a set of explana­
tory variables on the probability that a migrant will want to return to his home country. 
Secondly, and using only the subset of those migrants who intend to return, a duration 
analysis on the time the migrant still wants to remain in Germany will be performed.
Logit A nalysis
The logit specification may be derived directly from the underlying theory. Define a 
dichotomous variable Y  which takes the value 1 when the migrant does not want to 
return, and 0 otherwise. Should the migrant meet his decision right at the point of the 
interview, then Y  is determined by:
Y =
1 if T  -  t > 0 
0 if T - t < 0
(14)
where t and T  are defined as in section 2. Assuming a linear relation between t and 
a vector of explanatory variables, and introducing an additive random component u, 
one gets:
T  —1 = a 'X  — u;  X '  =  [1, A*, T‘, A'0*, 7”"] (15)
where A’, T”, A'°",T* are empirical specifications of A, F ,/t°, 7\ It follows that the 
probability that a migrant stays is given by:




























































































where S is used to standardize the random variable u and F is the CDF of u/S. Assum­
ing u/S to have a logistic distribution with mean 0 and variance 7r/3, the logit model 
evolves:
P{Y = 1) =
ex p(0'X)
1 +  exp(O'X)
where the estimated parameter vector is given by 0 = (a /S ).
(17)
D uration A nalysis
The second step of the analysis relates only to the subsample of those who want to 
return after a specific number of years.
The remaining intended duration of stay in the host country and, afterwards, the 
time back at home may be considered as two states which will sequentially be occupied 
by the migrant worker. At the point of expected return, a transition between these 
two states takes place. Given a migrant population, it is now of interest to investigate 
how these transitions, or, in other words, completions of spells, are distributed over 
time and how they depend on individual characteristics of the migrant. Remember 
that the analysis is performed on expectations of remaining durations, not on actually 
performed durations. Furthermore, the data available are data on the current stock of 
migrants in 1984. The estimates refer therefore to the (possibly selected) population 
of migrants in Germany in 1984, not to the population of migrants entering Germany 
at any one time.
The appropriate analytical tools are provided by the hazard function method, or 
transition analysis. The central concept of these methods is the hazard function f(f). 
Applied to the problem on hand, the hazard f  (/) would be defined as the conditional 
probability that a migrant’s intended further duration of stay, r , will end in f, given 
that it lasts until t (in continuous time):
«1 , -  lim r > ‘) _  _
’ it-0 dt 1 -  F(t) S(t)
In (18), /(<) is the density function of the random variable t , F(t) is the distribution 
function and S(t) is usually referred to as the survivor function. In parametric hazard 
models, F(t) is known up to a vector of unknown parameters which has to be estimated. 
An estimate of the hazard function is then easily constructable. However, the under­




























































































hazard, although following the same distribution, may vary among individuals with d- 
ifferent characteristics. To take account of such heterogeneity in the underlying sample 
population, the parameters of the distribution may be made functions of a vector of 
explanatory variables, or covariates.
The parametric approach imposes a strong restriction on the hazard: it has to 
follow a certain pattern as predetermined by the underlying distribution. Parametric 
methods are therefore justified only when the choice of the distribution of r , /(<), is 
based on some economic theory. Although the deterministic theoretical model of sec­
tion 2 provides some guidance regarding the choice of covariates and their qualitative 
impacts, it does not help to justify any distributional assumptions. Furthermore, para­
metric models impose a smooth shape on the baseline hazard function. This, however, 
contrasts with the lifetable estimates, as depicted in figure 1.
Therefore, two methods are chosen here that allow the estimation of the impact 
of covariates on the hazard without imposing strong restrictions on the behavior of the 
hazard over time: the proportional hazard model, as proposed by Cox (1972), and the 
piecewise constant exponential model. The latter method, though being parametric, 
is very flexible and should yield results that are similar to those of the non-parametric 
approach.
C ox’s Proportional Hazard Specification
A proportional hazard is defined as:
t(X,t) = t ( X J ) M t )  (19)
where X  is a vector of covariates, 0 is a parameter vector and fo is usually referred to as 
the baseline hazard. When X  is time invariant, which will be the case throughout the 
analysis, the proportional hazard specification implies that the quotient of the hazards 
of two individuals with regressor vectors X! and X 2 is constant for all t and equal to 
<l>(Xu p)/<t>(X2,P).
Cox (1972, 1975) suggested the method of partial likelihood to estimate the un­
known parameter vector in <t>(X, 0), without specifying the form of the baseline hazard 
MO-  The main idea of this method is that, when no information about the baseline 
hazard is available, only the order of the durations are used to infer the unknown 
coefficients of the covariates.10




























































































The specification chosen here for (j)(X, (3) is: (j>(X,(3) =  exp(X'(3). When no 
spells are censored (which is the case for the duration data used here), and when the 
completed durations are ordered, T\ < r2 < r3 < ... < r^ , the partial likelihood may 
be written as a function of the parameter vector (3:
N  '





where the terra in brackets is the conditional probability that observation i concludes a 
spell at 7j, given that any of the remaining observations j  > i could have ended a spell 
at T(. The partial likelihood function as depicted in (20) corresponds to the likelihood 
function estimated here.
It should be noted that Cox’s partial likelihood method is problematic if more 
than one individual experiences an event in the same time interval (tied ending times). 
As it is obvious from table 4 in the appendix, this is the case with the data used 
here. With tied data, the exact calculation of the partial likelihood becomes very 
complicated. Approximate formulas reduce in this case the computational burden. The 
approximation used here is that proposed by Breslow (1974). However, the adequacy 
of such approximations is sometimes questioned.11 To check the validity of the results 
for the continuous Cox model, discrete time models are additionally estimated. The 
method and the results are outlined in the appendix.
Piecew ise C onstant Hazards
The piecewise constant hazard specification is based on the exponentially parametric 
model. However, unlike the exponential model, which implies a constant hazard over 
the entire horizon considered, the piecewise exponential model allows the hazard to 
change between predetermined time intervals. The method is therefore appropriate 
when the underlying theory does not justify any distributional assumptions on r.
In the piecewise-constant formulation, the hazard may be written as:
£P(X, t) =  <j>(X, /3) exp(£.); Ji;-i < t < rij; i =  1,..., m ; no = 0, nm = oo (21)
where m is the number of time intervals chosen and (n, — n,_i) is the length of the i,k 
interval. Note that the intervals do not have to be of equal length. The baseline hazard 1




























































































exp(ti) is constant over the interval [ra,_i,ra;) and determined by the parameters £,, 
which have to be estimated. The specification of the intervals follows from table 4 
in the appendix. Data points on the expected duration clump at 5, 10, 15 etc years. 
The intervals for the piecewise constant specification are chosen so as to contain these 
critical numbers. ft) is some functional form of time-invariant covariates, with 
unknown parameter vector j3. The specification used here is the same as for the Cox 
model: <j>(X'(i}) =  exp(X'f)).
In the piecewise constant model, density- and survivor functions have discontinu­
ities at the limits of the respective intervals. For time invariant regressors, the piecewise 
constant hazard is (piecewise) proportional.
The hazard specifications in (21) and (19) are similar: both are proportional, 
and the baseline hazard in the Cox model, £0(f)i corresponds to the piecewise constant 
baseline hazard ea:p(^,) in the exponential specification. The interpretation of the vec­
tor of coefficients is accordingly analogous in both specifications: @c = (S ln£c)/(6 X)  
and jP =  (S ln£p)/(8X),  where /Jc and @r denote the coefficient vectors in the piecewise 
constant and the Cox model, respectively. The estimated coefficients indicate therefore 
the percentage change in the hazard when the respective variable changes by one unit.
Some Rem arks
Before proceeding, some remarks on the interpretation and comparability of the results 
in the two steps of the analysis seem appropriate. The logit analysis differentiates be­
tween two groups: those migrants who want to remain in Germany, and those migrants 
who want to return home at some future point in time. However, a migrant who replies 
that he wants to remain in the host country may have made this decision a long time 
before the interview. Therefore, measured characteristics of this migrant at the time of 
the interview are not necessarily those that determined his decision, when this decision 
has been taken in the past and when the relevant variables change over time. In other 
words, the probability of return may not be sensitive to all those factors implied by 
the theoretical considerations above. On the other hand, the number of years migrants 
want to stay before returning should be sensitive to the respective factors as they are 
measurable at the time of the interview. Accordingly, the explanatory value of the 




























































































3.2 D ata  and Specification  o f Variables
The logit analysis is based on migrant workers with Italian, Spanish, Yugoslavian, Turk­
ish, and Greek nationality, full-time employed, part-time employed or unemployed at 
the time of the interview, who specify whether or not they want to return to their home 
countries. After excluding all observations with missing values in relevant variables, 
the final number of observations used for the analysis reduces to 1734.
The duration analysis is based on the subset of those who intend to return home 
and who specify the time they wish to remain in Germany. Migrants could respond 
that they wish to return in the next 12 months or they could indicate a number of years. 
The duration variable DUR is set equal to one when the migrant wants to return in 
the next 12 months, otherwise it takes the value of the number of years specified. The 
number of observations available for the analysis is here 1094.12
Environm ent
The environmental differential 1 is represented by the following set of variables: the 
variable TRANSFER is a dummy variable and equal to 1 when the migrant transfers 
money back to his home country. PARTNER is a dummy variable that takes the value 
1 when the migrant’s partner is living in Germany. Both variables are indicators for 
social links to the home country. HSP and G s p  are dummies that are equal to I when 
the migrant speaks the home country language or the host country language well or 
very well, respectively. The knowledge of the German language may be an indicator for 
the migrant’s integration potential (or, likewise, his integration) into the foreign society. 
Good or very good knowledge of the host country language could be an indicator for 
the link to the home country environment. The dummies SCHOOL and ElJU assume 
the value 1 when the migrant attended a school in Germany or when he undertook a 
job-specific education in Germany. Finally, the variable Y sm  describes the years since 
migration. This variable may be an indicator for how much the migrant has alienated 
from his home country environment and adjusted to that of the host country.
W age Differentials
The second factor that should influence the migrant’s intention is the perceived earnings 
differential between host- and home country.13 Any intention of the migrant is based on
12188 of those migrants who answered that they wish to return (1282) did not specify how long they 
want to remain in Germany. They therefore had to be excluded from the duration analysis.




























































































the subjectively perceived earnings differential, which could be constructable were the 
migrant to have been asked about how much he expects to earn back home. However, 
the only data that are available are earnings in Germany of those who were employed 
at the time of the interview.
To construct an approximation for the individual, potential earnings differential 
of migrant workers, an earnings variable for those who are unemployed has first to 
be created. This could be done by estimating a human capital earnings equation 
for employed workers and using the coefficients of the estimation equation to predict 
earnings of those who are unemployed. However, such a procedure may possibly result 
in a sample selection bias. Therefore, the predictions of earnings for the unemployed 
are constructed by using a two-stage estimation procedure, as suggested by Heckman 
(1979). The method is outlined in the appendix. Estimation results are given in table 
5 in the appendix. The predicted earnings series is then used as an approximation of 
earnings potentials of unemployed migrants.
As a second step, earnings differentials have to be constructed. Data on earnings 
potentials of individual migrants in the home countries are not available, but only their 
earnings in Germany and their nationality. Under some assumptions it is, however, 
possible to construct from these information approximations of earnings differentials.
Denote the earnings of some migrant i with a given stock of human capital in 
Germany as EGi, and the earnings he would receive back home as Ell,.  Assume that 
when migrant A from country j  receives earnings in Germany that are ij%  higher than 
those of migrant B from country j . then Mr. A receives back home earnings that are 
likewise X j %  higher than those Mr. B would receive.14 This implies:
EGi -  EH, 
EG, (22)
Under the assumption that Xj is constant for all migrants from country j ,  the perceived 
earnings differential of some migrant i from country j ,  with earnings EGi in Germany, 
may be formulated as:
{ E G i-  EH,) = x, EGi (23)
14In other words, earnings in either country are a linear function of the stock of human capital. As­
sume that the stocks of human capital of Mr. A and Mr. B are given by H A and Hg, respectively, with 
Ha > Ha Assume further that the rental rate on a unit of human capital in the host country is given 
by rG and that in the home country by rE. Then (22) implies that rH HA/ r a HA = r"  I lg /r G Hg 




























































































Define a country index k, k =  1, ..j, ..n, and a dichotomous variable <4, where <4 equals 
1, should some migrant’s home country be k j , and 0 otherwise. Assuming linearity,
the effect of the wage differential may be formulated as:
f r x .E G i  + fa d t x t  EG, (24)
The coefficient A  captures the impact of the wage differential, perceived by migrant i 
from country k, on his intention. However, a perceived wage differential of the same size 
may affect two migrants differently, when they come from different countries. Reasons 
for this could be different costs of living in the two emigration countries, additional 
payments, tax systems, working conditions etc. The impact of this second effect is 
represented by the coefficient A-
For the empirical analysis, country j  will now be defined as base country. It 
follows for xk: x* =  x} + (xk — Xj).
Inserting this into (24):
A  *i EG, + [A xk <4 + A  (** -  *,)] EG, = EGi + <4 u  EG, (25)
Relation (25) is constructable when only dummies on migrants nationalities are avail­
able. However, without information on x, the structural coefficients A  and A  are 
not identifiable. The sign of the coefficient therefore depends on the difference in 
wage situations in country j  and country k., and, furthermore, on the difference in the 
reaction between migrants from country k and the base country j ■
T im e Horizon
Equation (13) implies that the length of the time horizon T has a positive impact on 
the expected duration. A natural approximation for T would be the age of the migrant 
worker. The theory suggests then that an increase in age should have a negative impact 
on t.
Labor Market Situation
To capture the impact of the migrant’s labor market experience, two variables are 
included in some specifications: UNEMP is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the 
migrant is unemployed, and UNEMPlO is a dummy that is equal to one when the 




























































































Table 1: Sample Characteristics, 1984. Whole sample and subsamples of those who 
wish to stay and who wish to return
Variable Whole Sai rnple Wish to Stay Wish to Return
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Monthly Gross Earnings (DM) 2413 728 2477 753 2391 719
Years since Migration 14.4 5.1 15.41 5.5 14.22 4.91
Age 38.86 10.9 38.39 10.9 39.02 10.9
Male 0.67 0.16 0.72 0.4 4 0.66 0.47
Married 0.82 * 0.76 * 0.84 *
Training in Germany 0.12 * 0.14 * 0.11 *
Schooling in Germany 0.17 * 0.2 * 0.16 *
Good or Very Good German 0.41 * 0.54 * 0.37 *
Good or Very Good Mother T ong ue 0.92 * 0.88 * 0.94 *
Transfers 0.44 * 0.29 * 0.49 *
Partner in Germany 0.76 * 0.74 * 0.77 *
Unemployed last 10 years 0.29 * 0.29 * 0.29 *
Unemployed 0.093 * 0.080 * 0.098 *
Greek 14.53 * 10.40 * 16.00 *
Italian 19.55 * 22.35 * 18.57 *
Jugoslavian 20.24 * 26.33 * 18.10 *
Spanish 14.71 * 16.54 * 14.18 *
Turkish 30.97 * 24.78 * 33.15 *
Sample Size 1734 452 1282
SOURCE: Socio-Economic Panel, wave 1, 1984.
Additionally, control variables are included for sex and marital status: the vari­
able MALE equals one when the migrant is male, and the variable MARRIED equals 
one when the migrant is married.
Table 1 presents characteristics of the total sample population and of the subsam­
ples of those who intend to stay and who intend to return. The last line indicates that 
74% of the sample population intends to return home sometimes in the future. The 
numbers on nationalities indicate that Italian, Jugoslavian and Spanish migrants have 
a stronger tendency to stay in Germany than migrants from Greece or from Turkey.
An average of 14.5 years since migration signifies that the stock of the migrant 
population resides in Germany for a considerable amount of years. Columns (2) and 




























































































returners. Average gross earnings of those who want to stay are slightly higher than of 
those who want to return. A higher percentage of migrants who intend to stay is male 
and a lower percentage is married. Transfer of money back home is considerably more 
common in the subsample of returners: 49%, compared with 29% in the subsample of 
stayers. More than half of those who want to stay speak the German language well or 
very well, compared with only 37% of those who wish to return.
3.3 R esu lts
Logit A nalysis
The results of the logit specifications are given in table 2.15 The dependent variable 
equals one when the migrant intends to return, and 0 otherwise. The estimated coeffi­
cients indicate the impact of the respective variable on the probability that the migrant 
wants to return home.16 17
The impact of earnings are captured by the variables G earn  and GEARNK, 
k — T,S, G, / , where the capital letters indicate Turks, Spaniards, Greeks, and Italian- 
s, respectively. The base group are Yugoslavians. The interpretation of the estimat­
ed coefficients as the impact of earnings differentials corresponds to the assumptions 
above. Since in 1984 wages in all industrial and agricultural sectors were lower in the 
respective emigration countries than in Germany1 , the quotient x should be positive 
for all countries considered. It follows for the Yugoslavian base group that an increase 
in earnings in Germany and, according to the above assumptions, a rising wage differ­
ential should have negative effects on the return probability. This is compatible with 
theoretical considerations. The impact of a given earnings differential on the return 
probabilities of migrants from the other 4 countries is easily calculable by summing 
up the coefficients on G earn  and GEARNK. According to (25), the resulting expres­
sion is equal to (0t + .A dp) x^, where 0p corresponds to the difference of the impact 
of some given differential between a Yugoslavian worker and a worker from country 
k. Referring to the results in column (2), this coefficient is positive only for Greek 
nationals. However, this does not mean that Greek nationals are acting contrary to 
what the theory would imply. As indicated above, the individual return probability is 
not necessarily very sensitive to the explaining variables, when these variables change
15The results of the logit analysis were obtained by using W. B. Greene’s LIMDEP and the results 
of the transition analysis by using TDA, written by G. Rohwer.
16In what follows, this probability will be referred to as return probability. Note, however, that it 
is in this context the probability of expected return.




























































































over time and when the decision to return has been taken sometime in the past. This is 
definitely the case for earnings differentials. It should further be kept in mind that the 
interpretation of the coefficients as the sensitivity of return probabilities on changes in 
earnings differentials underlies quite restrictive assumptions.
All variables representing the environmental differential have the expected sign 
and are mostly significant. The negative coefficient on the variable Ysm indicates that 
the return probability of a migrant worker decreases with the number of years he resides 
in Germany. Furthermore, the probability of return is lower for those who speak a good 
or very good German (Gsp), and whose partner is living in Germany (PARTNER). On 
the other side, a good or very good knowledge of the home country language (HSP) 
increases the return probability, as does the circumstance that the migrant transfers a 
part of his earnings back home (TRANSFER).
Keeping everything constant, and setting the return probability to the average 
sample return probability p = 0.65, the results in table 3.3 indicate that males have 
a return probability which is about 7 percentage points lower than that of females.18 
A reason for this result may be that male immigrants integrate more easily into the 
foreign society. Males may further be more concerned about their economic future than 
females and, accordingly, evaluate economic stability and working conditions higher 
than females.
The coefficient on the variable AGE should denote the impact of the remaining 
lifetime horizon on the migrant’s return probability. A g e  is, however, only significant 
in the first model specification (column 1). Upon introducing environmental variables 
(column (2) and (3)), AGE becomes insignificant, indicating that this variable only 
captures environmental factors, but not the impact of the remaining lifetime horizon on 
the migrant’s intention. This is not surprising. As for earnings, age changes over time, 
so that the migrant’s age at the time of the interview may contain little information 
about the impact of the lifetime horizon on the decision to stay when this decision was 
actually taken.
Column (3) presents results when dummies for the past and current employment 
situation are introduced. Having been unemployed at least once during the last 10 
years (UNEM PlO) has no significant impact on the probability to return. However, 
those who are unemployed at the time of the interview (UNEMP) want to return with 
a significantly higher probability than those who are in the work force. This effect is 
relatively large: again evaluated at p = 0.65, and keeping everything else constant, the 
return probability of unemployed migrants is 20% higher than that of their employed




























































































Table 2: Logit Analysis, Return Decisions
Variable (1) (2) ( 3 )
Constant 1.35 1.73 1.79
(5.05) (3.35) (3.38)
Earn -0.22 -0.25 -0.29
(-2.32) (-2.58) (-2.89)
Earnt 0.25 0.21 0.20
(4.06) (3.27) (3.09)
Earng 0.38 0.35 0.35
(4.87) (4.24) (4.23)
Earns 0.18 0.14 0.13
(2.46) (1.82) (1 76)
Earn i 0.10 0.14 0.14
(1.57) (2.13) (2.08)
Ysm -0.077 -0.061 -0.062
(-5.38) (-4.02) (-4.06)
Age 0.017 0.007 0.006
(2.64) (0.88) (0.749)
Male -0.24 -0.34 -0.31
(-1.65) (-2.29) (-2.04)


















Log — Likelihood -951 -907 -904
No. o f  Obs. 1734 1734 1734
Return 1282 1282 1282
Stay 452 452 452
SOURCE: Socio-Economic Panel, wave: 1, 1984.
Note: t-ratios in parenthesis. Coefficients of 




























































































colleagues. This result contradicts the common view that migrants take advantage of 
the favorable German benefit system and would therefore rather prefer to be unem­
ployed in Germany than returning home.
D uration Analysis
The estimated coefficients on the covariates for the duration models are reported in 
table 3. Note again that this analysis is performed only on the subsample of those who 
intend to return home, and who additionally specified the number of years they still 
want to remain in Germany. Furthermore, note that the analysis relates to expected 
future durations of a stock of migrant workers in 1984, not to completed durations.
Eoth duration models are of the proportional hazard form. Therefore, the coeffi­
cients can be interpreted as the constant proportional effect of the respective variable 
on the conditional probability of completing a spell. In other words, the coefficients 
indicate the percentage change in the hazard, when the respective variable changes by 
one unit.
A global goodness-of-fit test as proposed by Moreau. O'Quigley and Mesbah 
(1985) was performed to assess the validity of the proportional hazard model. The 
basic idea of the test is to check whether the effect of the covariates, which under 
the proportional hazard assumption is constant and measured by 0. varies as a step 
function between time intervals. To test the null hypothesis of a proportional hazard, 
Moreau, O’Quigley and Mesbah propose a score test. Under the null hypothesis, the 
appropriate test statistic is asymptotically \ 2 distributed, with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of parameters.19 The same definition of intervals as for the piecewise 
constant formulation is used, except for the last interval.20 The test statistics for the 
small and the large model specifications (Columns (3) and (4) in table 3) are then 
given by 55.31 (45) and 85.66 (85), with degrees of freedom in parenthesis. Therefore, 
the null hypothesis of the validity of the proportional hazard specification can not be 
rejected in both cases.
The first two columns in table 3 report the results of specifications of t he piecewise 
constant model.21 Column (3) and (4) present estimated coefficients of the Cox models.
19Since it is supposed that the effect of covariates differs between intervals, the number of parameters 
equals the number of covariates times the number of intervals chosen.
20Since the last interval contains not enough observations, the test breaks down when performed 
over all intervals. Therefore, the last two intervals are merged to one interval.




























































































Table 3: Duration Analysis
P iecewise Constant Cox
V a r i a b l e ( i ) (2) ( 3 ) ( 4 )
E a r n -0.145 -0.163 -0.130 -0.120
(-2.63) (-2.78) (-2.23) (-2.36)
E a r n t 0.107 0.095 0.080 0.092
(3.14) (2.66) (2.68) (2.23)
E a r n g 0.089 0.090 0.065 0.065
(2.17) (2.17) (1.61) (1.59)
E a r n s -0.050 -0.047 -0.047 -0.046
(-1.18) (-1.04) (-1.07) (-1.02)
E a r n  i 0.050 0.066 0.058 0.046
(1.22) (1.57) (1.13) (1.39)
Y s m -0.023 -0.023 -0.020 -0.021
(-2.92) (-2.78) (-2.58) • (-2.48)
A g e 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018
(5.57) (4.47) (5.12) (4.09)
Male 0.084 0.067 0.062 0.048
(1.09) (0.83) (0.80) (0.59)
M a r r i e d -0.077 0.309 -0.084 0.25
(-0.82) (2.10) (-0.90) (1.72)
E d u -0.021 -0.017
(-0.18) (-0.14)
S c h o o l 0.061 0.063
(0.49) (0.51)
G s p -0.058 -0.062
(-0.83) (-0.90)
H s p -0.092 -0.0G7
(-0.71) (-0.51)
T r a n s f e r 0.139 0.120
(2.06) (1-79)
P a r t n e r -0.361 -0.314
(-3.06) (-2.68)
U n e m p I O 0.082 0.063
(1.07) (0.81)
U n e m p 0.347 0.318
(2.83) (2.60)
N  o.o fO bs. 1094 







SOURCE: Socio-Economic Panel, wave 1, 1984. Note: t-ratios in 




























































































As could be expected, the coefficients of the respective specifications for the Cox models 
and the piecewise constant models are similar in size.
The coefficients of the earnings variables are all multiplied by 1000. Estimates 
of both the Cox- and the piecewise constant specifications indicate that an increase 
in earnings has a negative impact on the hazard for all nationalities. This impact is 
largest for Yugoslavian and Spanish workers. Remember that this may be due to the 
size of x*. It may as well be due to different effects of a given earnings differential on 
intentions of migrants with different nationalities, as denoted by dk- The qualitative 
impact of earnings on the hazard is consistent with the theory.
The variable AGE is strongly significant in all specifications. Different from the 
logit results, Age remains here significant when environmental variables are included. 
The coefficient may be interpreted as the impact of a change in the lifetime horizon on 
the migration decision. Referring to column (3), being 1 year older, which corresponds 
to a reduction of a fixed lifetime horizon by one year, increases the hazard by 1.9%. 
The size of this effect is similar in all specifications.
Turning to the environmental variables (column (2) and (-1)). both a good or 
very good knowledge of the German language and the home country language do 
not influence the hazard significantly. Remember that these variables significantly 
influenced the return probability in the logit analysis above.
The coefficients on the variables S c h o o l  and E du are not significant as they 
were neither in the logit specification. Accordingly, visiting a school in Germany or 
getting a job specific education seems not to have an impact on the migrant's duration 
intention or his return probability.
The coefficient on the variable PARTNER is negative and significant. Consequent­
ly, having a partner in Germany decreases the conditional probability of ending a spell 
at some t. On the other side, transferring money home increases this probability (see 
coefficients on TRANSFER). As the coefficients on the variable Ysm indicate, each 
additional year the migrant has been in Germany decreases the hazard by 2.3% (ex­
ponential) or 2.1% (Cox). The qualitative impact of all these variables corresponds to 
what the theoretical model suggested.
Being male (MALE) does not affect the hazard. This is in contrast to the findings 
of the logit specifications, where males had a lower return probability than females. 
T he  coefficient on the variable MARRIED is negative, but insignificant in specifications 
(1) and (3). It is positive and significant when introducing environmental variables.
The fact that the migrant has been unemployed at least once during the past 10 




























































































at the time of the interview (UNEMP) increases the hazard. The effect is considerable: 
The conditional probability that an unemployed migrant wishes to return at some t 
is more than 30% higher than that of a comparable migrant who is employed at the 
time of the interview. Again, this result is contrary to the assertion that migrants take 
advantage of the benefit system. An unemployed migrant has a higher conditional 
probability to return at an early stage than a comparable employed colleague.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the survivor function for the Cox model and the hazard 
function for the piecewise constant exponential model (for male, turkish workers with 
age and earnings set to the sample mean and all dummies set to zero).
4 C on clu sion
The subject of this study is the analysis of return intentions of migrant workers. Sec­
tion 2 presents a theoretical analysis on the migrant’s savings- and return decisions. 
The model explains common features of return migration, like the accumulation of sav­
ings while being abroad. The time the migrant intends to remain further abroad (and, 
at the extreme, the intention to stay permanently) is shown to depend basically on 4 
factors: the migrant’s earnings potential at home, relative to what he earns abroad, the 
migrant’s perception and evaluation of environmental factors, such as family, friend- 
s, social regulations etc., at home relative to those abroad, the migrant’s remaining 
lifetime horizon, and his stock of savings accumulated at the time of decision making.
The qualitative implications of the theory are empirically tested, using data from 
the first wave of the German Socio-Economic panel. The empirical analysis is based 
on the information about whether the migrant intends to return or not, and, in the 
case of intended return, on the number of years he still wishes to remain in Germany.
As a first step, and using the whole sample of those who want and who do 
not want to return, logit models are estimated, where the dependent variable is the 
intention of the migrant whether or not to return. As a second step, and considering 
only the subset of those who wish to return, a duration analysis is performed. The 
spell variable is the migrant’s intended further duration of stay in the host country. In 
both stages, the empirical results are found to be mostly consistent with predictions of 
the theoretical model.
The logit analysis reveals that the time of residence in Germany significantly 
reduces the return probability, as does the presence of the partner, and the ability 
to speak the German language well or very well. Males are less probable to return 




























































































the impact of variables that capture earnings differentials and the lifetime horizon are 
inconclusive. The reason may be that the decision to return is likely to have been 
taken some time before the interview. If those variables that capture characteristics 
which influenced the migrant’s decision in the past are measured with a considerable 
lag, as it may be the case here, and if, additionally, they change over time, they may 
not represent their impact on the past decision. Finally, being unemployed at the time 
of the interview has a positive effect on the return probability.
For the duration analysis, two specifications are chosen that do not impose strong 
restrictions on the baseline hazard: the Cox model and the piecewise constant expo­
nential model. The results support the hypothesis that higher earnings differentials 
are reducing the hazard. Furthermore, the coefficients of the variable AGE are here 
significant and have the expected sign. This indicates that a longer future lifetime 
horizon decreases the conditional probability to leave the country at some t.
Variables that represent the environmental factor have, should they be significant, 
the expected sign. Furthermore, those who are unemployed at the time of the interview 
have a higher conditional probability to return at an early stage than their employed 
colleagues.
The analysis provides some evidence that migrants return decisions are endoge­
nous outcomes of an intertemporal optimization of lifetime utility. The understanding 
of the structure of this decision procedure is important to develop efficient migration 
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A p p en d ix  1: P o ten tia l Earnings o f  th e  U nem ployed
Earnings are only observable for those migrants who are in the  labor force. This group 
may be a  selected subsam ple of the whole population of employed and unemployed workers. 
Therefore, predictions of earnings of unemployed m igrants, based on simple OLS estim ates of 
coefficients of earnings equations for the employed, may not correctly tell what a  currently 
unemployed worker w ith a  given vector of characteristics would earn. To see this, define a 
variable /,•:





migrant i employed 
migrant i unemployed
Consider further the following relation:
Iji = 0 'x i  +  It,
The variable y, may denote earnings and x, are individual characteristics and human capital 
variables, fi is a  param eter vector and u,- is a normally distributed error term . Earnings are 
only observed for those who are employed. I t follows th a t for these cases:
E (y i) = 0 'x i + E (u i \Ii = l )  (26)
Only when the process which selects individuals into the unem ploym ent pool is independent 
from u ,, no selection bias will arise. To account for possible selection bias and to correctly 
predict the potential earnings of those who are unemployed, a  simple two step procedure as 
proposed by Heckman (1979) is used. This procedure basically introduces a  further variable, 
call it A, in the regression equation so as to ensure th a t the last term  in (26) vanishes.22 In the 
first step, a  probit specification is estim ated on the probability th a t a person is unemployed. 
Estim ation results are then used to calculate an estim ate for A, which will be added to the 
regressors of the OLS specification.
22When the selection rule is described by a simple probit model, it can be shown that E(«j|/,- = 
1) = —a[f(zi 6 )/F(z{ 8)\ =  —o’A,, where /( .)  and F(.) are the density function and the distribution 
function of a standardized normal random variable, z is a vector of variables which explains the 
selection process and 6 the corresponding parameter vector, a is then the covariance between the OLS 
error term and the standard normal random variable of the probit specification. It is now easy to see 
that the addition of the new variable A, among the regressors implies a new error term e* =  u, +  a A*, 




























































































In the second step, ols estimation yields parameter estimates that are unbiased and 
consistent.23
Coefficient estim ates are given in table 6. The variables ScH and T rain denote years 
of schooling and job specific education, respectively, both measured after the age of 14. The 
variables Y emp and Y empsq are years of full employment and the square of years of full 
em ploym ent, respectively. The variables Ysm and Ysmsq are years since m igration and 
the  square of years since migration. The dummy variable Part is equal to one when a 
person is part-tim e employed, and T ur, J ug, Ita and G r are dummy variables for Turkish, 
Jugoslavian, Italian and Greek nationality, respectively. All o ther variables correspond to  the 
notation  used above.
A p p en d ix  2: D iscrete T im e C om plem entary Log-Log M odels
As indicated above, the estim ation of a  continuous time Cox model is problem atic when 
survival times have ties. Although algorithm s exist (and are used above) to approxim ate the 
partia l likelihood when dealing with tied da ta , it seem advisable to  check the validity of the 
results by reestim ating some discrete versions of the Cox model.
Following Allison (1982), the discrete-tim e hazard function th a t corresponds to the 
continuous tim e proportional hazard function is given by
£t =  1 -  exp [-e x p  ( a ,  +  6'X t )] (27)
The set of constants a t ( t= l ,2 v .) can be left unspecified. Following M antel and Hankey 
(1978), a t will here be expressed as a  polynomial in t. The model will then be estim ated  
by maximum likelihood.24 The results for different degrees of the polynomial are given in 
table 7. The significant coefficients are similar in size and in sign to  those obtained from the 
continuous Cox model.
23Note that the error terms of the extended OLS regression are heteroscedastic. Furthermore, stan­
dard t-tests which are based on the OLS standard errors do not help to correctly assess the signifi­
cance of the results, since some of the explanatory variables are estimated (see, for example, Madalla 
(1983)). Reported t-statistics are based on the correct, asymptotic standard errors (for the derivation, 
see Greene (1981)).




























































































A p p en dix  3: Tables






















































































































Table 5: Piecewise Constant Hazards
Variable (1) (2)
fi (Period i) -2.55 -2.53
(-15.65) (-10.82)
(Period 2) -2.28 -2.25
(-13.77) (-9.55)
(Period 3) -1.67 -1.63
(10.30) (7.01)
(Period 4) -2.75 -2.72
(14.02) (10.53)
( 0  (Period 5) -1.40 -1.35
(-8.65) (-5.81)
(Period 6) -2.11 -2.03
(-11.50) (-8.17)
( 7  (Period T) -1.42 -1.31
(7.01) (4.93)
No. o f  Obs. 1094 1094
SOURCE: Socio-Economic Panel, wave 1, 
1984. t-ratios in parenthesis. Piecewise 




























































































T able  6: E arn ings E qu a tio n s 










































No. o f  Obs. 1734 1572
Adj.R2 * 0.45
SOURCE: Socio-Economic Panel, wave 1, 




























































































Table 7: Discrete Time Complementary Log-Log Models
Variable (i) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Earn -0.133 -0.173 -0.170 -0.171 -0.171
(-2.29) (-2.94) (-2.89) (-2.91) (-2.90)
Earnt 0.086 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.097
(2.42) (2.70) (2.71) (2.72) (2.72)
Earng 0.069 0.091 0.092 0.091 0.091
(1.68) (2.20) (2.21) (2.19) (2.19)
Earns -0.033 -0.055 -0.055 -0.053 -0.053
(-0.74) (-1.22) (-1.21) (-1.15) (-1.16)
Earni 0.068 0.063 0.066 0.063 0.063
(1.63) (1.51) (1.57) (1.50) (149)
Ysm -0.021 -0.023 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024
(-2.49) (-2.75) (-2.81) (-2.91) (-2.82)
Age 0.016 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020
(3.79) (4.50) (4.52) (4.55) (4.56)
Male 0.039 0.077 0.072 0.075 0.075
(0.49) (0.96) (0.90) (0.93) (0.93)
Married 0.26 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.32
(178) (2.20) (2.27) (2.18) (2.18)
Edl' -0.020 -0.018 -0.015 -0.017 -0.016
(-0.17) (-0.15) (-0.13) (-0.14) (-0.13)
School 0.061 0.048 0.055 0.053 0.053
(0.49) (0.38) (0.44) (0.42) (0.42)
Gsp -0.052 -0.062 -0.064 -0.061 -0.061
(-0.75) (-0.89) (-0.92) (-0.88) (-0.88)
Hsp -0.069 -0.092 -0.090 -0.093 -0.061
(-0.52) (-0.70) (-0.69) (-0.71) (-0.71)
Transfer 0.120 0.151 0.149 0.150 0.150
(1.82) (2.22) (2.19) (2.20) (2.20)
Partner -0.31 -0.38 -0.38 -0.37 -0.37
(-2.65) (-3.21) (-3.23) (-3.19) (-3.19)
UnempIO 0.072 0.093 0.092 0.091 0.090
(0.93) (1.20) (1.18) (1.17) (1.16)
Unemp 0.31 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.36
(2.54) (3.02) (3.00) (2.99) (2.98)
<■*1 * 0.049 0.067 0.115 0.098
(8.18) (3.92) (3.11) (1.34)
<* 2 * * - 0.001 -0.006 -0.003
(-1.10) (-1.67) (-0.25)
« 3 * * * 0.0001 - 0.0000
(1.48) (0.06)
<*4
* * * * 0.0000
(0.26)
N  o.ofO bs. 1094 









SOURCE: Socio-Economic Panel, wave 1, 1984. t-ratios in 
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